



The Performative “I” as Constitutive Lack and the Failure of the Subject of Transgender Characters in Select South Asian Novels

Lede E Miki Pohshna

Abstract

The Lacanian Symbolic Order encompasses the entire field of human language and existence, involving function of speech and consequently, the entire range of signifier(s). The subject as such locates its existence within the symbolic through subjectivization and signification. The performativity of the utterance “I” which totalizes the subject is taken to be a function of a well-defined locus within the symbolic and the consequential differentiation of identification with the phallus through sexuation. This paper will argue that the transgender as a phenomenon of subjectivization is triggered when the subject experiences a lack. This constitutive lack however is not the lack of (and in) the object per se but rather that of the subject. The subject enters a realm of negativity and is negated by the Object. When this occurs, the subject as defined and predicated by the privileged signifier is negated by the annihilation of the performative “I”. A such, Subject formation is entirely a negative process. This paper will also theorise on the performative “I” as an important, yet unexplored, marker of Performativity. This paper will examine two transgender characters Bhanggi in *This House of Clay and Water* (2017) and Shankar in *Mohanaswamy* (2016) and explore their relation to the symbolic order and view it as an attempt to escape it.

Keywords: Performative I, Subject, Symbolic Order, Lacan, Transgender

The formation of subject entails two important disruptions – the constant rupture of the signified bar through which the signifier suffused into the realm of the signified. That is to say the disruption, taken the form of a rupture, systemically creates a new order of signifier over the combinatorial axis. The axial of combination- hitherto the function of a metonymic signifying chain- affects a relation in the signifying function in a way that conceptualises the utterance in the discourse (what Ferdinand de Saussure called the ‘*langue*’) within the symbolic order (Fink 45). This is the formation of the split subject and the beginning of the separation of the ego from the “I”. (Borch-Jacobsen &

Brick 91). The symbolic order is the order of the language (Lacan, *Four Fundamentals*, 246). In other word, the symbolic order is a discursive reality whereby subjective meanings could be sought, placated, disrupted, and realised. The second aspect of the subject formation is the formation in the *Imago* – the figure not in but behind the mirror image – which effectuates the subjective breaking down of what constitute the “I” as differentiated from the image in the mirror or the little other. The *Imago* is understood not as the reflection of interiority for the latter is a spatial dimension of the “I” and Carl Jung observes that Imago is a persona that the unconscious emulated which comes from outside such as “the personality of the parents among the things that in the childhood stage had the greatest significance, plays the primary role” (132). It is this exteriority that places it outside the mirror- the scope of the imaginary which belies systemic symbolization. It cannot be subsumed within the “I” but rather it is taken to be a breaking down of the “I”. The integral-ity of the subject is broken down between what constitutive the alterity between the “I” and the space through which the “I” is differentiated. The lack of the imaginary to fully totalize the “I”, which results in its breaking down, enables the symbolic to subsume subject formation within its realm. However, the subject of the symbolic is never fixed, a position which it posits and quite understandably understands the threat of such disruption which in most cases always results in some attempt to restore a semblance of equilibrium to this highly unstable subject, a point that Slavoj Žižek made (99). When one looks upon the formulation of the subject, one wonders about the implication of the signifier associatives therein vis-à-vis the subject- namely how a disrupted signifier affects the algorithmic operation of the signified logic. Subsequently, this have an affectation upon the very formulation of utterance- the very enunciation that is a result from the disruption of language as it seeks to totalize the very essence of “Be” which is constitutive of every reality that the unconscious mitigates as homologous substantiation to transference and eventual escape to the surface. What really escape to the surface

is the phenomenon that this paper would theorize by looking at the select South Asian novels – *This House of Clay and Water* (2017) and *Mohanaswamy* (2016).

Transgenderism, as a phenomenon, can be understood in some way within South Asian context through the presence of the *hijra* persona, though being transgender is not necessarily synonymous with being a *hijra* and both positions operate through different subjectivisation and such processes may not overlap. The *Hijra* is a rubric term used to identify those groups of people, including “eunuchs”¹, intersex people, and transgender people² (Al Mamun et al 171, Seow, 132). Kate Bornstein defines transgender as “gender outlaw” – whereby the notion of the specificity of certain gender legal sanction is taken by default and those outside the purview of the gender “law” can be seen as transgender. While this definition is radical and broad and have many critics, it also points to the multi-dimensionality of examining the scope of transgenderism which could include even ‘straight people’³. Stone defines transgender as “...entails a resistance of passing, a refusal to conform with the appearance or reality of either sex” (299). This definition marks a line through which transgender could be differentiated from transsexualism. Western Critical Theory in general and Queer Theory in particular, despite their profound impact in interrogating presumptive fixed notions of gender and sexuality, could not account for the complexities of sexualities in South Asia because, as Michel Foucault points out, Western Civilization lacks the aesthetic possibilities of conceiving sexualities other than the mechanistic and through scientific curiosity⁴ (1976). This paper will explore the complexities and subtleties of transgender within the South Asian context by examining the transgender characters Bhanggi in *This House of Clay and Water* and Shankar Gowda in *Mohanaswamy*.

Bhanggi, the character in the novel *This House of Clay and Water*, is introduced in the second chapter. It was not the physical description of his appearance that is being portrayed but his subjective lamentations about his body. He says:

My body, ji, is not my own. It's a communal vessel for lust that finds expression in dark corners. I learnt that early in my life, na. I am like the space that belong to no one; a dirty thought never acknowledged. This cage of bones and flesh that holds me prisoner...makes a mockery of me and my desire, destroy me daily...(5).

The introduction to Bhanggi, the hijra character, indicates a discord (or rather a break) in the relationship between the body and the subject. The (im)materiality of the body is symptomatic of the disruption in the signifier taking the body as a signifying of the subject as "I Am". The "I" does not totalise the body and here is the crux of the matter- the body is supposedly to be performative of the "I" whose desires, denoted by 'object *a*', echoes its translatability in spaces as the extension of the materiality of the body. Bhanggi's body as a cut rather than a totalizer in the signifying chain that eventuates the subject-oriented physicality implying that Bhanggi could look beyond the subject for the purpose of drawing a relationship between the "I" – delineated from the subject- and the object per se.

The utterance of the word "I", the very echo that carries with it an element of climactic subjectivization, is nothing more than the shifting in the coordinates and speaking of the "I" as the position within a cartesian algebra to be mapped with, the signifier-signified schema of Lacan along with the formulation stands as:

$$f(S)\frac{I}{S}$$

which would be indicative of how the "I" is not constitutive of the promissory stabilized signifier(s) as much as it is not substitutive within the axial of substitution-combination (Lacan, *Ecrits*, 181). However, what it does is to perpetuate the disruption of even the letter within the unconscious, represented by the horizontal bar, the cross-over or slippage through that bar that happens when the signifying chain whose function is to inscribe desire into the subject's utterance reaches completion.

One aspect of the utterance "I" is its performativity. Judith Butler, of performativity, expresses:

Most performatives, for instances, are statements that, in the uttering, also perform a certain action and exercise binding power. Implicated in a network of authorization and punishment, performatives tend to include legal sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, declarations of ownership, statements which not only perform an action but confer a binding power on the action performed. If the power of discourse to produce that which its names linked with the question of performativity, then performativity is one domain in which power act *as* discourse (171).

Performatives, as explained by Butler, are those statements that have the ability to confer power of action which is binding upon the party to which they are directed. Therefore, the declaration "I pronounce you..." exemplified by John Langshaw Austin indicates that the speech and the "I" take part within a larger discourse preceding the "I" which the "I" itself draws its locus standi (Butler 171). The ability of the utterance to enact performance to the third party that it so uttered is an example of performative utterance and forms the basis for performance theory. However, what this paper proposes is that performative utterance should be delimited further into its bare bone- leaving the basis of which it is constitutive i.e the "I" as an independent and viable unit of performativity. Judith Butler opines that "where there is an 'I' who utters or speaks and thereby produces an effect in discourse, there is first a discourse which precedes and enables that 'I' (171)". To an extent that the locus of the "I" is within the general discourse which it is produced and affected, and as far as that constitute a subject to which the "I" recognizes, it is conceivable that Butler's contention is appropriate. However, what if the "I" do not seek to affect a performance upon another subject but within its own discourse- in other word, there is an absence of superimposition between the subject (castrated) and the effect of which the signifiers repressed the unconscious. Lacan's formula:




Figure 1 (Source: Szczech)

can be re-written as




Figure 2 (Source: Author)

The object a , which is the remnant of the real (figure 1) that masks the imaginary phallus is not absent but subsumed behind the subject. What this implies is that the performative “I”- when the subject is barred, marks the escape from the Symbolic. Bhanggi’s insistence on the dichotomy between his body and his self is a marked boundary of a breakthrough which the disruption of meaning, hence signifiers, failed to effectuate a subject-formation. In other word, the self is the locus through which the utterance “I Am” fixes itself against the interpellation of the object a . What can be construed of Bhanggi’s declaration

is that the phrase “my body is not my own” can be read as ‘I Am not my Body’ and that the declaree is not the effectuation of the totalising “I” since the totalising “I” equivalently fixes the body to the self. The self is not predicated by the materiality of his body and as such the “I” in Bhanggi should be further differentiated. What can be understood from this is that the phrase “my own” carries with it a different reality that negates the body. Therefore, the pronoun “my” can be understood as a projection of the “I” but this “I” is broken down into the exteriority of the material and the imago and the interiority of the self and essence and the dichotomy between these two polarities. Such interior sense of self that directs the actions can be understood as the smallest unit of identification- the performative “I”. In Bhanggi’s case of identification, the performative “I” instead of directing actions and behaviours which the body will execute is instead problematised by the body itself as it refuses to cooperate with the I and also with what the Other has to project on the body. This in turn effectuates the constitutive lack in Bhanggi.

The performative “I” is that part of speech that is not implicative upon the other subjects in the enactments of its discursive performance but rather seeks to locate the subject solely as object and direct the power and authority of performativity upon itself. As such the subject can be properly understood through desire (Borch-Jacobsen and Brick 91) because the latter enables the formation of subject through two operations the first of such being the desire of the mother and the suppression of such desire through the name-of-the-father which institute the law and secondly, the entrance into the phallic order marks the formation of the subject-position within a paradigm supplemented by bearing of the Other (Dean 44-49). The performative “I” is reflexive in the way of speaking that when one utters “I” one is already looking back, and already supplied the necessary element within the subset of “I” in such a way as to render that “I” a performance based upon the elements within that subset which “I” encapsulated. So, the reducibility of Bhanggi’s utterance that his body doesn’t belong to him, in as

such as I am not my body, points to an alterity of the subject. The otherness of the subject which points to the dichotomy between the material and the essence moves toward the dimension of lack. The subject is the other because the subject constitutes a lack which is not the lack in the other but the lack in the subject itself (Deleuze and Guattari 26). Desire is not because the subject lacks the other. It is a reversible syndrome symptomatic of transgender. Bhanggi says, “The way my body responded to a woman’s was not something I shared with the other hijras of the chawl” (45). Bhanggi’s desire for a woman is symptomatic of his inability to acquire womanhood which he repeatedly refers in the novel- that womanhood is forever outside his reach. The fixative on womanhood obliterates the subject within him. In figure 2, the gap between the subject and the other is the *objet petit desire*, a state of the real- in this case The ~~Woman~~⁵- that is constantly out of the field of his own subject position. For instance, when Bhanggi waits for Nida, he describes his desires for her as “I don’t know whether it is my body or my soul that hungers for her” (Mansab, 241). The clamouring of the body can be understood as the longing of the object of desire whereas the longing of the soul is much more interpersonal as it is personal and can be understood as a desired cause by object. At this point, Bhanggi is still confused whether he longs for Nida as a woman or whether he longs for her womanhood. The object *a* is the cause of the cause of desire and Bhanggi’s desires for a woman can be read within this line. After their sexual intercourse, Bhanggi opines:

She is my lost half. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that she is already a part of me. She is my eve, only partially separated. The rest of her remains with me, and she comes looking for it. Part of her resides within me still. I am neither male nor female because of her. She refuses to part, refuses to let go, so I must remain a true hijra. (Mansab 245)

Evidently, it is not Nadia that he longs *per se* but the idea of her womanhood and he always wanted to approach that idea and get a glimpse of it. But only half of it is attainable for it is grounded in the real- the ~~La femme~~. Bhanggi approaches his

subjecthood through that unattainable pre-jouissant figure and the figure of a symbolic woman, Nadia, can only fulfil half of that process but the remaining has to be within him but is forever out of his reach. Therefore, when Banggi says, “Each one of us chooses to wear a disguise but the mask for the hijras ...aren’t chosen by them” (Mansab 44), it is connotative of the body as a mask, and this is an important conclusion. The whole idea of being a woman rest upon the assumption that femininity can be acquired or at least performed (van den Wijngaard 4). However, Bhanggi’s situation shows that the performativity of womanhood is just a mask- or rather something that hides the real and at the same time allows the real to manifest in glimpses. This paradoxical situation is due to the very paradoxical nature of the mask whereby it both hides and conceal at the same time. What the mask accomplishes in effect is to cancel the sign and leave bare only the signified. So, the mask removes the metonymic function which signifiers effectuate and perpetuate the subject, which arises when the subject sets on the combination axis and promulgate signs for its affectation (Lacan, *Ecrits*, 164). Bhanggi’s feminized body serves as a mask that conceals the masculine in him but also reveals the otherness of subjectivity through his longing for Nadia. Bhanggi both desires and identifies with womanhood and this effectuates a unique sense of subjectivity in him. The “I” that demands he performs the appearance of a woman also demands that he performs the desires of a man. Hence the performative “I” can be understood as a lack as it tries to constitute these two binary opposites within the same subjectivity.

Womanhood, in Bhanggi’s case, is a performance grounded in the constitutive lack. As mentioned above, femininity is only a mask for the hijra which, upon being worn and performed, enables a glimpse of the real- the state of affair where the subject constitutes the lack. The subject, however, could never be the ~~woman~~ not because it is barred from entering the phallic order which is the realm of the masculine in as much as it negates other signifiers⁶, but due to the lack in the Other (A). Slavoj Zizek opines that:

The lack in the other means that there is a remainder, a non-integratable residuum in the Other, object *a*, and the subject is able to avoid total alienation only insofar as it posits itself as the correlative of this remainder: $S \diamond a$. In this sense, one is able to conceive of a subject that is distinct from the ego. The place where the imaginary misrecognition: A subject that is not lost in the 'process without subject' of the structural combination (13)

The performative "I" is not the subject position but the *point de capiton*, which offers a counterbalance to stop the slippage of signifiers under the signified. It offers a semblance of fixatives, perfunctory illusion of stabilised subjectivities. It is capable of such effectuation as it performs a certain doubling action whereby the performer either perform for a character of one self or for an audience (Landay 130). Moreover, the object-cause desire produces a state of negativity, an illusory real which is constitutive of a lack as it is inherently grounded in the real itself. The performative "I", in case of Bhanggi, then cause nothing to happen. It is a lack, deeply immersed in this state of negation. Bhanggi is being told, "It isn't what God forgot to give those matters; it is also what he forgot to take out. Your desires are that of a man but your body, never will be" (Mansab 47). The body here is the site of negation, where on one hand, it is moulded within the context of masculinity while on the other hand, it is a negation of that masculinity. Bhanggi's body is *das Ding*, "impossible to imagine it" (Lacan, *The Ethics*, 125) situated within the register of the real. This begs a question: How can a corporeality becomes the Thing (*das Ding*) when the latter locates within the unattainable and forever receding real? The answer is the body (Bhanggi's) is immaterial in the sense that it is a state of negation. Its corporeality doesn't preclude the fact about its approximation of the real by refusing to enter the symbolic while at the same time it is *a priori* outside the Imaginary.

The Performative "I" creates a suture in the otherwise tightly interwoven chains that marries the psyche to the body, a position that is always exterior and is only brought into the

subject position through the signifying chain. Lacan's sexuation formula does not take into account the body as a pre-condition for being sexed in as much as biology is precluded from the axis a-a' that brings out the conditionality of sex (Szczech 11). The utterance "I am..." (whatever the predicate is) is effectuated *a priori* by the condition of "I", it's supposed position beyond the reach of the imaginary, and refusing altogether to enter the symbolic. When Bhanggi declares, "I am a hijra", the positionality of the hijra is not that of a signified as the latter implies certain ideas but in Bhanggi's case such ideas as negated as discussed earlier. It is a mask through which the "I" performed itself by the process of negation which is manifested in the body. The appearance of femininity in the masculine subject as such is the object-cause desire and this object is a lack, a constitutive lack if one must say, because the "I" cannot enter the symbolic. There is no subject in transgenderism because it is outside the symbolic⁷. The performative "I" serves as a subjective position by proxy while at the same time executes the function of the *point de capiton*.

Another transgender character that I would like to explore is Shankar Gowda in *Mohanaswamy* by Vasudhendra. Shankar Gowda is a minor character in the novel but they⁸ play a significant role in understanding the performative "I" in particular and queer subjectivity in general. Always described from the third person point of view and always by the other, what we could ascertain of their life⁹ is through the description of Kommi. It is remarkable to observe what Bhanggi takes on the hijra when he said, "I was not born male, ji. So, there was no castration. I am a true hijra" (Mansab 79). Kommi describes Shankar Gowda "He ran away to Mumbai. Stayed there for six months. He got his dick chopped off and came back wearing a sari and a blouse" (Vasudhendra 191). Unlike Bhanggi, Shankar Gowda had themselves castrated and with this castration, the lack within them operates on three different level- the imaginary, the symbolic and the real. The penis as an imaginary phallus is well established by Butler and other¹⁰. While Millot observes that the phallus could "admits of at least two different

reading” (33), Dean add the real phallus into Millot’s reading (83). Dean says:

At the Imaginary level, the phallus is the penis and women are perceived as castrated. This reading of the phallus indicates that in the imaginary the phallus is eminently detachable and amenable to circulation. As detachable, the imaginary phallus implies that men, as well, as women, are subject to the threat of castration, while also suggesting, correlatively, that women may gain the phallus just as much as men. (83)

Shankar Gowda’s position within the feminine axial makes them lose the imaginary phallus. Thus, his identification with the women, at least on this level, suggests that womanhood is inherently linked to the phallus and, consequently, to the penis. This is also a point that Judith Butler makes in *Bodies that Matter* (1993). However, this does not negate fact that the phallus is not the only mark of sexed being (if it ever does at all) because the woman as a signified is also tied to the symbolic phallus, the privileged signifier. The act of castration would also imply to the loss of meaning, the inability of language to articulate a point beyond what is constraint by the phallic signifier, a notion affirms by Nadia when she says, “Maybe Bhanggi and I defeat language itself” (Mansab 222). This defeat of language can be understood exactly in this term i.e the wilful discard of meaning which the realm of the language contains. Millot opines that, “whatever one’s biological sex, it is one’s position relative to the phallus that determines whether one is a man or woman’ (38). Here, the subject is unsexed, the unconscious has no knowledge of sexual difference (Lacan, *On Feminine*, 17) However, the castration also operates on the level of the real- the phallus here stands for the limit to the *jouissance*, and castration is the access of *jouissance* (Dean 88). Shankar Gowda’s act of castration then aims not in the imaginary, where subject-position is acquired through one’s loss of the imaginary phallus- and such simplistic attempt to acquire femininity doesn’t rest well with Lacan’s theory. What Shankar Gowda achieves, in so far as their act of castration entails is the *jouissance* and the attempt to enter and acquire the position of ~~Lafemme~~ *Lafemme*. This is the

mythic figure, the primordial mother figure with unlimited access to *jouissance* (Dean 89). Shankar Gowda's position is the attempt to reach this mythic figure. Shankar Gowda is not simply trying to be a woman- they are trying to be The Woman. Kommi describes Shankar Gowda's sexual prowess as, 'he began luring men in the town with his tap one by one. He was stunning...women in our town were no match for him' (Vasudhendra 192). This is Shankar Gowda's glimpses of ~~La~~ La . Both Shankar Gowda and Bhanggi, despite the difference in their quest for femininity, can only find their subject-position within the real and this leads to the failure of the subject, as understood from the paradigm of the operation of $\Phi(x)$ which is a phallic function. The Performative "I" understood as a lack in the subject enters the real through the mythic figure of ~~La~~ La or pre-jouissant. Szczech upon graphing the axis of subject through the phallic function in attempting to demonstrate Lacan's famous axiom that there is no sexual relationship shows that "A subject's ideal partner, their complement, is found in a direction orthogonal to their subjective status: for masculine subjects this would mean the imaginary axis and, as can be seen, feminine subjects are elsewhere" (13). She draws the graph as:




Figure 3 (Szczech)

What can be taken from this graph is that the opposite binary of the masculine subject lies not in the Imaginary, which in effect would indicate that Shankar Gowda's act of phallic castration is not effective in creating a feminine subject which they could identify with in as much as that femininity is within the imaginary conception. However, both Bhanggi and Shankar

Gowda transverse the space of fictive possibilities through the real which enacts a semblance of subjectivity in them. The real is devoid of signifiers and the performative “I” is the “No-Thing” which the real lack, an entity whose meanings are castrated and with that, the signifiers.

Marjorie Garber’s remarkable pronouncement, “there can be no culture without the transvestite because the latter marks the entry into the symbolic” (354) is to be seen along the same light as Butler or Edelman’s reading of queer subjectivities. However, as we have seen, transgenderism actually marks the leaving from the symbolic, as propounded by Dean and Millot and into the real. However, the real is a state of negativity that cannot be attained anymore and only manifest itself through the object and the occasional moments of the sublime. The appearance of femininity, which Bhanggi called the mask, is the object *a* through which the performative “I” manifest itself. Bhanggi’s dysphoria between the “I” and the body results in the mutual inability of both the “I” and the body to support, complement, synchronize and realise one another. As such the performative “I” instead of effectuating subjecthood effectuate a constitutive lack which results in the failure of such subject and the escape from the symbolic and into the real through the effectuation of object *a* . For Shankar Gowda, the act of castration effectively removes them from the realm of the symbolic through its attempt in acquiring the unlimited jouissance which the phallus puts a limit to. And castration also enables them to create a discord between the performative “I” and the imago as the latter is being replaced by the mythic ~~La~~. As such, the failing of the symbolic in constituting subjecthood is , again, due to the constitutive lack that the performative “I” finds itself.

End Notes:

1. Many hijras and trans-right activists have urged the government of India to discontinue the usage of the word eunuch in its official documents when refereeing to the hijra community.

2. The definition of hijra has also been phallocentric and the irregularity of the male genitalia has been a prime index. See Serena Nanda's *Neither Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India* (1999).
3. Tim Dean (2006) has interpreted Kate Bornstein's definition as all encompassing because it allows for the possibility of many subjective positions to be within what is understood as Transgender, p 62.
4. Camille Paglia points out that the Birth of the Western Eye- the Western Civilization sense of Aestheticism starts from Egypt which then moved to the Graeco-roman civilization. See *Sexual Personae*, Yale University Press, 1990.
5. The ~~Woman~~ or ~~La femme~~ or simply ~~La~~ are term used by Lacan to denote a barred woman or a woman without the other.
6. The name-of-the-father is a signifier which enables the entrance of the subject into the symbolic. See Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection*, p 67.
7. Tim dean opines that transgender transcended gender whereas Millot opines that transsexuality is the position which lies outside sex.
8. I use the term they since Shankar, unlike Bhanggi who identified as a "he", never identify as he or she.
9. Shankar never identifies with any gender and always refers to as a "he" in the novel.
10. See Butler (1993); Edelman (1994), Silverman (1992)

Works Cited

- Al Mamun, Abdullah, Mariano M.L. Hayden and Qaiser Rafique Yasser. "Transgender Individuals in Asian Islamic Countries: An Overview of Workplace Diversity and Inclusion Issues in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia". *Sexual Orientation and Transgender Issues in Organization*, edited by Thomas Koellen, Springer, 2016, pp. 167-180.
- Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, Douglas Brick. "What is Called Subject? A Note on Lacan "Linguistery". In *L'Esprit Createur*. Vol. 29, no., 1989, pp. 83-96.
- Bornstein, Kate. *Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us*. Routledge, 1994.

- Butler, Judith. *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limit of Sex*. Routledge, 1993.
- Dean, Tim. *Beyond Sexuality*. University of Chicago P, 2000.
- Edelman, Lee. *Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory*. Routledge, 1994.
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge*. Penguin UK, 1976.
- Fink, Bruce. *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*. Princeton UP, 1995.
- Garber, Marjorie. *Vested Interests: Cross- Dressing and Cultural Anxiety*. Routledge, 1992.
- Jung, Carl Gustav. *Complete Work, Vol 4, Freud and Psychoanalysis*. Editorial Trotta, 2000
- Lacan, Jacques. *Ecrits: A Selection, 1977*. translated by Alan Sheridan, Routledge Classics, 2010.
- . *The Four Fundamental concepts of Psycho-Analysis*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. W.W. Norton and Co, 1998.
- . *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limit of Love and Knowledge, Book XX, Encore 1972-1973*. Translated by Bruce Fink. W.W. Norton, 1998
- . *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book VII*. Edited by Jacques-Alan Miller. translated by Dennis Porter. Routledge, 1992.
- Landay, Lori. "The Mirror of Performance: Kinaesthetics, Subjectivity, and the Body in Film, Television, and Virtual Worlds". *Cinema Journal*, vol. 51, no. 3, 2012, pp 129-136. JSTOR <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23253896>.
- Millot, Catherine. *Horsexe: Essays on Transexuality*. Autonomedia, 1989.
- Mansab, Faiqa. *This House of Clay and Water*. Penguin, 2017.
- Nanda, Serena. *Neither Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India*. Wordsworth Publishing, 1992.
- Seow, Lynelle. *CultureShock! India: A Survivor's Guide to Custom and Etiquettes*. Marshall Cavendish, 2017.
- Silverman, Kaja. "The Lacanian Phallus". *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1992, pp. 84-115.

- Stone, Sharon. "The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto". *Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity*, edited by Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub, Routledge, 1991.
- Szzech, Yolande. *The Lacanian Subject: From Mathematics to Jouissance*. Unpublished Dissertation. *Researchgate*. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292707819>.
- van den Wijngaard, Marianne. *Reinventing the Sexes: The Biomedical Construction of Femininity and Masculinity*. Indiana UP, 1997.
- Vasudhendra. *Mohanaswamy*. translated by Rashmi Terdal. Harper Perennial, 2016.
- Zizek, Slavoj. *Interrogating the Real*. edited by Rex Butler and Scott Stephens. Bloomsbury, 2005.